Abstract:
This thesis addresses two key challenges in securing Controller Area
Networks (CAN): efficient group key establishment and secure time
synchronization among Electronic Control Units (ECUs). To support
message authentication, the first part deals with fast and scalable key exchange
protocols based on the FourQ elliptic curve. Two authenticated
schemes are implemented — one certificate-based, the other identitybased—
both outperforming existing solutions in execution time. These
form the basis for three group key exchange schemes, enabling dynamic
and secure key agreement among multiple ECUs with minimal overhead.
Designed for compatibility with AUTOSAR, these protocols support
deployment in real-world automotive environments. The second
part focuses on securing time synchronization over CAN. A vulnerability
analysis of the AUTOSAR Time Synchronization over CAN protocol
reveals susceptibility to spoofing, replay, delay, and forecasting
attacks. A security-enhanced version is proposed, integrating challengeresponse
mechanisms and multi-MAC authentication. Additionally, the
protocol also adds support for clock rate corrections to maintain longterm
synchronization accuracy. Evaluations using real CAN traffic confirm
minimal network impact and sub-microsecond synchronization accuracy.
The thesis also proposes a method for DMA-based timestamping
to replace CPU interrupts and introduces a system-level redundancy
architecture for fault-tolerant and secure synchronization, which leverages
bus-independent protocols such as NTP to synchronize ECUs with
time sources located on different CAN buses or external networks. Together,
these contributions strengthen the foundations of CAN security,
improving both robustness and performance while remaining aligned
with industry standards.